









Continuity and Change in the South 

















Published by the Centre for Social Science Research 















ISBN: 978-1-77011-342-8  
 
 
© Centre for Social Science Research, UCT, 2015 
 
 
 Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International  
 








About the author: 
 
Jeremy Seekings is Professor of Political Studies and Sociology, and Director of the 
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The overall shape of the class structure in South Africa changed little after 
1994. The upper and middle classes have grown and prospered, and poverty has 
probably declined somewhat among the lower classes, but the basic shape 
remained unchanged. Evidence from survey data is consistent with data from 
other sources. The racial composition of some classes has changed, however, 
with steady upward mobility by black people into the upper classes. The class 
structure continues to entail three broad strata: affluent and increasingly 
deracialised upper classes, the lower middle and working classes which have 
enjoyed some improvements in their living conditions, and the lower classes of 
working poor and the underclass, for whom political change has brought fewest 
economic benefits. In contrast to Marxist analyses that see lower middle, 
working and lower classes as parts of the same class, this paper argues that 





Between 1994 and 2014 the overall shape of the South African class structure 
changed modestly, ensuring the persistence of both poverty and inequality. A 
variety of commentators have pointed to the growth of the ‘middle class(es)’ – 
and especially the ‘black middle class(es)’ – but typically use the term ‘middle 
class’ to refer to higher-income groups, not to anything that class theorists 
would recognise as ‘classes’. In this paper I update the analysis of the South 
African class structure published in Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa 
(Seekings and Nattrass, 2005), using survey data from 2008 and drawing on 
qualitative research into class since 1994 in various parts of South Africa. There 
have been some minor changes, including the growing affluence of the ‘upper’, 
‘upper middle’ and even ‘lower middle’ classes, and a small drop in poverty 
among the lower classes. Overall, however, the basic shape of the class structure 




3 ‘upper’ classes, defined by occupation 
(managerial or professional), wealth or 
(substantial) business activity: 
12% of households, 45% of income 
 
4 classes in a middle position: the semi-
professional class, intermediate class, core 
working class and petty traders: 
48% of households, 45% of income 
 
3 ‘lower’ classes: the marginal working class, 
underclass (defined in terms of systematic 
disadvantage in the labour market) and a 
residual ‘other’ category: 
41% of households, 10% of income  
In Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa we argued for the importance of 
class in explaining the persistence of economic inequality in South Africa 
despite the formal deracialisation of public policy. We drew on Marxian and 
Weberian theory, and combined original analysis of quantitative data (from 
household surveys) with critical use of a wide range of secondary historical, 
anthropological and sociological studies. In contrast to the Marxian political 
economy that dominated academic debate in South Africa, we paid explicit 
theoretical and empirical attention to gradations of advantage and disadvantage 
within the non-capitalist population. We analysed the South African class 
structure at the end of apartheid, using 1993 data, in terms of ten classes that 
could be combined into three broad strata (see Figure 1 below).1 Our empirical 
analysis identified a common class location to each household, depending on a 
mix of the characteristics of individual household members (in relation to 
production) and the characteristics of the household as a whole (in relation to 
income from wealth or businesses). We showed that households in these classes 
and three composite strata enjoyed, in 1993, very different life-chances in a 
number of respects. Our class schema exhibited both ‘internal’ and ‘external 














Source: Seekings and Nattrass, 2005.  
 
Figure 1: The Class Structure of South Africa at the end of apartheid  
 
 
The ‘top’ stratum comprised what we called the ‘upper classes’: Households 
with substantial income from wealth or business together with households in 
which the breadwinners were in executive or professional employment (i.e. 
households that would be thought of as part of the ‘upper middle class’ in most 
advanced capitalist societies). The middle stratum comprised what are often 
considered to be the ‘lower middle’ and ‘working’ classes in most advanced 
                                           
1 Our overall schema was not dualist, as suggested by Callebert (2014). See Seekings (2014). 
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capitalist societies: people in blue- or white-collar occupations, mostly skilled 
but with some semi-skilled, or even unskilled, industrial or public sector 
workers and their immediate dependents, together with ‘petty traders’, i.e. 
households with a modest income from business (or wealth). The lower stratum 
comprised most of the working poor – employees in waged agricultural or 
domestic work – and their dependents, together with households where no one 
was working, and which had only a minimal income from ‘survivalist’ self-
employment or from pensions and grants. 
 
Alexander, Ceruti and their colleagues at the University of Johannesburg later 
completed a somewhat different analysis of class in one urban area in Gauteng, 
Soweto (Alexander et al., 2013).2 Using a combination of survey and interview 
data, mostly collected during 2005-06, Alexander et al. argued that (in Soweto) 
the unemployed, semi-employed, self-employed and the employed were thrown 
together in a shared ‘proletarian community of fate’. Whilst people occupied 
varied positions in relation to both individual employment and household 
membership, the differences between these positions were modest (according to 
Alexander et al.) in crucial (but not all) respects. Barchiesi (2011), drawing on 
his research on the East Rand (also in Gauteng), and Callebert (2014), 
conceptually rather than empirically, criticised the distinction we drew between 
the middle and lower strata, emphasising the ‘precariousness’ experienced by 
working people in the face of ‘neoliberal globalisation’ (Barchiesi, 2011; also 
Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009) and the reliance on mixed livelihood 
strategies by non-rich households (Callebert, 2014). 
 
At the same time, Alexander et al. (2013) recognised that there was some 
differentiation, even within the specific social and economic confines of Soweto. 
Alexander acknowledged that ‘there is a gap between “workers” and “the 
poor”’, and people have ‘different daily experiences of work, survival and inter-
personal relationships’ and ‘different capacities to mobilise to change those 
experiences’ (Alexander, 2013a: 29-30). Soweto was, nonetheless, a 
‘differentiated proletarian township’ and these differences did not amount to 
class differences (2013a: 25). Alexander et al. also recognised that many better-
off Sowetans had moved out of the township.  
 
Other scholars also pointed to important gradations within the non-elite 
population. Barchiesi described the labour market as ‘highly stratified’ between 
workers in formal, ‘proper’ jobs (usually permanent and with benefits), the 
working poor in casual, intermittent, or informal employment, and the long-term 
unemployed, located mostly in rural areas (Barchiesi, 2010). Murray contrasted 
                                           




‘the urban poor and marginalized underclasses’ in Johannesburg with better-off, 
formally-employed working classes (Murray, 2011: 108):  ‘The variegated 
multitudes of impoverished urban residents have crystalised into a permanent 
underclass, constantly moving back and forth between casual and informal 
work, self-employment, and unemployment, largely dependent on the outside 
assistance of others for their survival’ (Murray, 2008: 18). For Murray, the 
‘urban poor’ and ‘underclass’ were defined by their lack of ‘access to decent 
housing, stable jobs, and social services’ (Murray, 2011: 203). Bank draws on 
Wacquant’s work on ‘urban outcasts’ in the USA to understand the social 
landscape of East London’s Duncan Village (in the Eastern Cape). In East 
London, as in the USA, ‘de-proletarianization’, social exclusion, and policing 
had produced a ‘precariat’ – comprising (in Wacquant’s description) ‘temporary 
workers, the casually employed, the unemployed, welfare dependents and urban 
informal workers, both legal and illegal’ (quoted in Bank, 2011: 214) – that was 
separate from the working as well as middle classes. In Duncan Village, ‘fewer 
and fewer people have stable formal sector jobs’, those that do wish to move 
out, and the streets have become dangerous and lawless … [D]e-industrialisation 
has destroyed the old township working class’ (2011: 233, 241). Mosoetsa 
(2011) similarly describes townships in KwaZulu-Natal where most households 
are, and feel, excluded from the benefits of formal employment and working-
class life. Studies of young people point to wide variation in advantage and 
disadvantage (Bray et al., 2010; Newman and De Lannoy, 2014). 
 
In short, there has been a widespread recognition of differentiation within the 
non-elite population, but scholars have been divided (and even inconsistent) as 
to whether this warranted distinguishing discrete classes, as we did in Class, 
Race and Inequality.  How should these differences be conceptualised? 
According to what criteria are differences of this kind significant enough to 
warrant these social categories being labelled as distinct strata or classes? Put 
another way, what does it mean to distinguish intra-class differentiation (as 
illustrated in Figure 2a, using dashed lines) rather than class differentiation or 








                                           
3 The composition or labels of the different strata shown in Figures 2a and 2b and the precise 
location of the ‘class’ division drawn in the middle of Figure 2b are purely illustrative and 
should not be understood as precise representations. Their purpose of these illustrations is 















Figure 2a: Intra-class differentiation      Figure 2b: Inter-class differentiation 
 
 
Whether differentiation is considered intra-class or inter-class is determined in 
considerable part by scholars’ preferred theoretical starting-points. Alexander et 
al. approached the analysis of difference from a Marxian direction, with little 
consideration of differential access to any scarce resources other than economic 
property or capital, and not considering the consequences of differentiation (i.e. 
life-chances) in their analysis of differentiation itself. Ceruti argued that, ‘using 
the classic Marxist phrase, what the long-term unemployed share with workers 
is not whether they have sold their labour power or on what terms, but that they 
have nothing else to sell, regardless of their distance from labour markets and of 
how appropriately embellished their labour power may be’ (2013b: 103, 
emphasis in the original). When she described Soweto as ‘proletarian’, she did 
not mean that most of the population was in waged employment, but rather that 
it comprised people whose only resource was their labour and whose 
‘opportunities’ were ‘circumscribed by the availability of employment’ (2013b: 
97). For Alexander, ‘the long-term interests of workers and the poor are similar, 
unlike those of workers and capitalists’ (2013a: 30). In this view, teachers and 
the unemployed are members of the same class not because they are similarly 
exploited, but because, lacking ‘property’, they share the possibility of 
exploitation, and therefore are considered to have a common interest in 
eliminating exploitation (and achieving emancipation) through the socialisation 
of property under socialism (Alexander, 2013b: 241-2). For Alexander et al., 
‘property’ comprises only economic or financial capital. This view is based on a 
particular reading of Marxist theory. It contrasts with the more Weberian 
approach that we incorporated into our 2005 analysis in two important respects, 
First, we viewed skills and educational credentials (‘human capital’) and 
connections (‘social capital’) as additional, important and scarce resources (or 
property) – and we would now add ‘cultural capital’ to this list of scarce 
resources that people try to monopolise and use to improve their life-chances. 
Secondly, we argued that differentiation should be considered as class 



















For Alexander et al., even demonstrably large differences in the life-chances of 
(for example) teachers and the rural unemployed would not undermine the 
assumption that they share membership of a differentiated yet single, composite 
class. 
 
It might not matter that different scholars prefer different labels on the basis of 
different theoretical starting-points, as long as we recognise that these labels are 
just labels and are derived from theoretical choices. The point is to make sense 
of the empirical data on differentiation so as to understand whether, how and 
why people have divergent life-chances or lived experiences, interests and 
identities. Alexander et al. criticised some aspects of the empirical strategy we 
employed in Class, Race and Inequality. In almost every case, they echoed 
concerns that we ourselves had raised: we lacked good evidence on mobility 
rates between classes over time (Ceruti, 2013b: 114-115; see Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005: 232-4, 277-280, 322-326); our measures of social capital were 
far from ideal (Alexander, 2013a: 22, fn 37; see Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: 
287); and the relationships between individual and household class position 
remained unclear (Ceruti, 2013b: 101; see Seekings, 2003a: 14-15; also 
Seekings, 2007b; Mosoetsa, 2011). 
 
A more fundamental criticism of the class analysis presented in Class, Race and 
Inequality is its neglect of cultural dimensions of class. Whether there was (and 
is) a distinct status order in South Africa, separate from the class structure, as 
Weber might have argued, or if class only has real meaning through its cultural 
forms, as Bourdieu might have argued, it is clearly important to examine the 
ways in which identities, classificatory labels, taste, lifestyles and respect were 
(and are) integral to differentiation and stratification (Seekings, 2008b; Selzer 




2. Continuity and change in the class structure, 
1993 to 2008 
 
Over the fifteen years from 1993 to 2008 the class structure of South Africa 
changed marginally whilst remaining fundamentally the same. The lack of major 
structural change is unsurprising: The economy remained capitalist with 
enduringly high unemployment, negligible land reform and only modest 
expansions of both self-employment (whether formal or informal) and the small 
business sector. The structural changes, whilst small, are nonetheless revealing: 
The ‘upper classes’ grew and accounted for a larger share of total income, whilst 
the lower middle and working classes seem to have shrunk marginally (due 
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primarily to the shrinking core working class) and the ‘lower’ classes shrank 
marginally but maintained their income share (primarily due to redistribution 
and decommodification through government grants and pensions). This is not a 
simple story to interpret: The rich prospered, as they did in the ‘gilded age’ that 
characterised most capitalist societies in the early 2000s, and some of their gross 
gains were redistributed to the poor. The class that shrank most was the ‘core 
working class’, comprising less skilled workers in industrial employment. The 
dramatic shrinkage of this class reflected the decline of less skilled industrial 
employment, which was not so much due to deindustrialisation per se as to the 
changing skill composition of the industrial workforce. 
 
Table 1: Sources of income of households according to expenditure, 
2006 
 
Note: working people includes people who in the last seven days did any work for a wage, salary, commission or 
payment in kind, ran any kind of business (big or small), did any work as a domestic worker, or was temporarily 
absent form any such work.    
Source: GHS 2006. 
 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of households between classes, their respective 
incomes and income shares in 1993 and 2008, using the 1993 data previously 
analysed in Class, Race and Inequality and 2008 data from NIDS. Differences 
between the surveys make it impossible to replicate exactly the methodology, so 
the comparison should be regarded as approximate rather than precise. 
Furthermore, there are strong grounds for believing that household incomes 
were underestimated in 2008, probably because of under-reporting of working 
people with above-median earnings. Insofar as this as the case, then the income 
shares in 2008 of the ‘upper classes’ and, to a lesser extent, the ‘lower middle 
and working classes’ are underestimated  in Table 2. Figure 3 represents the 
summary results in the same way as Figure 1.4 
                                           
4 To avoid confusion, I have relabelled some of the class categories. The ‘professional and 
managerial’ class was formerly labelled the UC or Upper Class (causing confusion between 
this and the composite ‘Upper Classes’ stratum). The ‘business’ and ‘self-employed’ 














Number of people n 
the household who 
were working 
0 56 46 27 8 34 
1 39 45 51 38 45 
2 or more 6 9 22 53 35 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
8 
 






































Business 1 8.0 11 4 5.1 19 
Professional & 
management  
9 3.4 30 11 2.7 29 
Self-employed 2 2.4 4 3 2.4 7 








5 1.7 8 3 1.6 4 
Intermediate 19 1.2 22 23 0.8 18 
Petty traders 5 0.6 4 11 0.6 7 
Core working 19 0.6 11 10 0.6 6 







12 0.3 4 8 0.3 3 
Underclass 
29 0.2 6 
12 0.2 2 
Other  16 0.3 5 
Sub-total 41 0.2 10 36 0.3 10 
Total 100 1.0 100 100 1.0 100 
  








                                                                                                                                    
categories were formerly labelled WE1 and WE2 (where WE stood for wealth and 
entrepreneurship). The ‘petty traders’ category is the former WE3 category. These data differ 
from those reported in a previous publication (Seekings, 2011b). The earlier data were 
erroneous for two reasons. First, the NIDS household income data included imputed income 
for households with missing income data. My preliminary calculations firstly mis-allocated 
households with large imputed incomes to the residual ‘other’ category. Secondly, I failed to 





3 ‘upper’ classes: 
17% of households, 55% of income 
  
 
4 ‘lower middle and working classes’: 
46% of households, 35% of income 
 
 
3 ‘lower’ classes: 












Source: calculated from NIDS data. 
 
Figure 3: The Class Structure of South Africa, 2008  
 
 
Whilst the broad continuities and changes between 1993 and 2008 are probably 
robust to the details of the methodology employed, more detailed shifts may be 
the product of methodological rather than real changes. For example, it is 
unclear how much of the growth and prosperity of the ‘business’ class, i.e. the 
class defined by their considerable income from wealth or business, is the result 
of better data-collection (including the imputation of missing data) in NIDS 
compared to the 1993 PSLSD. 
 
The data are consistent with other evidence on the changing social character of 
class in post-apartheid South Africa. In 1993, more than half of the households 
in the upper classes comprised white people. By 2008, there were fewer ‘white’ 
than ‘African’ households in the upper classes (one-third compared with almost 
one-half). The distribution of white household between strata had not changed, 
but ‘white’ households comprised a shrinking proportion of the total. The 
proportion of African households that were in the upper classes grew 
dramatically. The data on class thus reflected the continuing deracialisation of 
the upper classes. By 2008, the upper , lower middle and working classes 
remained disproportionately concentrated, in terms of geography,  in the six 
major metropolitan areas (Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban, 
the East Rand and Pretoria), but only one in four households in the lower classes 
were in the metropolitan areas. The upper classes and lower middle and working 
classes were overwhelmingly urban, whereas more than half of the lower classes 
were rural. In formal tribal authority areas, i.e. the former bantustans, 63 percent 
of households were in the lower classes, with only 7 percent in the upper classes 
and 31 percent in the lower middle and working classes. 
 
Both during and after apartheid, public policies (and the power of big business 
and organised labour) helped to push the economy further down a capital- and 
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skill-intensive growth path, with employment opportunities for the unskilled 
increasingly restricted to informal and/or non-tradable sectors. In terms of 
employment (although less so output), the economy underwent some 
deindustrialisation, with a shift from mining (with the decline of employment in 
gold partly offset by the growth of platinum) and manufacturing to services. In 
many other countries, deindustrialisation was associated with a more polarised 
‘post-Fordist’ class structure, with growth in both high-income and low-wage 
jobs but shrinking middle-income employment, primarily because employment 
in services was more differentiated than industrial employment. In other cases, 
however, deindustrialisation was associated with the decline of low-wage as 
well as medium-wage jobs. This process of ‘professionalisation’ characterised 
London, for example. A series of studies of Cape Town suggested that it 
experienced post-Fordist polarisation, as jobs shifted from manufacturing to 
sectors such as tourism (Turok, 2001; Lemanski, 2007; McDonald, 2008). Some 
of the data used in these studies were flawed however (Crankshaw, 2012). A 
thorough analysis by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2008) found that middle-
income manufacturing jobs had been replaced by middle-income white-collar 
service sector jobs (see also Crankshaw, 2012) – a shift identified in 
Johannesburg (Selzer and Heller, 2010; Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014). In 
short, the occupational data on employed individuals points to much the same 
trend as the household class data: In post-apartheid South Africa, there was no 
net process of polarisation, but rather a picture of unevenly distributed gains. 
 
The causes of changes in the occupational structure are rather less clear, 
however, than implied in most of the literature on ‘post-Fordist class 
restructuring’. Occupational change – or ‘class restructuring’ – was not entirely 
the result of exogenous changes in the economy, but resulted at least in part 
from wage settlements and related public policies (including industrial as well as 
labour market policies) that helped to push the economy down a more capital- 
and skill-intensive growth path. The high-wage, high-productivity strategy 
followed by trade unions and the state (with the support or at least acquiescence 
of big business) contributed to declining industrial employment (the 
‘deindustrialisation’ of the occupational structure) and the expansion of 
employment in sectors that were either unregulated (including most of the 
services), semi-autonomous from the market (public sector employment), or 
non-tradable. Post-Fordist shifts in the occupational structure were thus in part 
the consequence not the cause of a restructuring of class power. 
 
Some of the correlates of class in 2008 are evident in Table 3. Households in the 
upper classes are much more likely to own cars (with implications for many 
aspects of social and economic life) and computers. Adults are much more likely 
to have completed matric, and adolescents are much more likely to have 
progressed appropriately in school. Women are much less likely to have 
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experienced the death of a child. Employment rates are much higher, as is 
satisfaction with life. By most (but not all) of these measures, the lower classes 
were more disadvantaged than the lower middle and working classes. NIDS 
focused on economics aspects of welfare, and included few questions about 
cultural, social and political issues. Other research as well as recent fiction have, 
however, addressed many of these concerns, and it is possible to use these to 
provide a fuller picture of the class structure in South Africa. 
 
 













Proportion of households owning a private car 
in working condition 
64% 19% 3% 21% 
Proportion of households with a computer at 
home 
47% 10% 1% 13% 
Proportion of adults aged 20-59 with matric 74% 35% 17% 36% 
Proportion of women aged 25-40 who had 
given birth to a child who had later died 
4% 12% 13% 11% 
Proportion of 17 year-olds who had completed 
grade 10 
84% 57% 42% 53% 
Employment rate, adults aged 25-59 82% 71% 21% 58% 
Satisfaction with life, adults aged 20-59, mean 
using 10-point scale 
6.6 5.6 4.7 5.5 
 
 
3. The upper classes 
 
Affluence was always conspicuous in South Africa. Rich, white South Africans 
drove smart cars, lived in palatial suburban homes with swimming pools, and 
enjoyed expensive holidays (at the same time as they paid their domestic 
employees low wages and housed them in austere accommodation, often 
separated from their own families). The end of apartheid brought the repeal of 
restrictions on upward occupational, income and residential mobility on the 
basis of racial classification, accelerated the expansion of secondary and tertiary 
education, and coincided with the changing (post-Fordist) structure of the 
economy. Together, these changes resulted in the expansion of affluence. As we 
saw above (Table 2), the composite upper classes grew between 1993 and 2008. 
Post-apartheid affluence was generally evident in South African cities in 
booming malls, high-end restaurants and the buoyant prices of houses and land. 
Affluence became even more visible as some of the new black elite indulged in 
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highly conspicuous consumption, especially of expensive cars and clothes. 
Behaviour such as businessman Kenny Kunene’s parties where sushi was served 
on the bodies of naked or near-naked women, Julius Malema (ANC Youth 
League President until his expulsion, and then leader of the opposition 
Economic Freedom Fighters) flaunting his Gucci suits and his Breitling watch 
(supposedly costing R250,000 or US$25,000), rap musician ‘Jub Jub’ 
Maarohanye taking cocaine before drag-racing his Mini Cooper (killing four 
teenagers and injuring two others), and government ministers routinely 
demanding top-end cars were widely considered to be the tips of the consumerist 
iceberg. Shopping malls were the new temples of mass affluence. New patterns 
of residential segregation in gated estates, some with private golf courses, 
ironically served to emphasise the distinctive affluence of the new elite and 
upper middle classes. 
 
The extraordinary growth of top incomes can certainly be attributed to 
neoliberalism. Top incomes in South Africa over the course of the twentieth 
century have been analysed by Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010), as part of their 
cross-national study using mostly tax data. The top 1 percent (with incomes 
above 400,000 Rand in 2005) accounted for almost 20 percent of total gross 
income in 2004. The top 0.1 percent (with incomes above 1 million Rand) 
accounted for about 5 percent (2010: 12, 15). Top incomes rose dramatically in 
the early 2000s. High commodity prices and buoyant stock markets also meant 
that the wealthy became wealthier. By the end of 2013, South Africa boasted six 
dollar billionaires and almost 50,000 dollar millionaires, whose combined 
wealth accounted for as much as one-third of the country’s total wealth.5 South 
Africa’s rich elite benefited from both high returns on their wealth and much 
higher executive earnings than prior to 2000, and from a social and political 
environment in which very high incomes were legitimate but high tax rates were 
not. 
 
Curiously, the income share of the elite in South Africa was lower at the end of 
the twentieth century than it had been at its beginning. Around 1920, the top 1 
percent in South Africa accounted for a massive 20 percent of total income, a 
share that was ‘higher than, or close to, the shares in the UK and North 
America’ and ‘well above the top shares in Australia and New Zealand’. The 
income share of the super-rich in South Africa fell over the course of the 
twentieth century, as it did in most other countries (Alvaredo and Atkinson, 
2010: 20). There does not appear to be any evidence on whether the income 
share of the super-rich rose after 1994, as it seems to have done under 
‘neoliberalism’ in some other countries. The super-rich are unlikely to be 
                                           
5 ‘Aspen CEO Saad joins the list of SA billionaires’, Business Day, 21st January 2014, citing 
estimates by New World Wealth. 
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included in survey samples: South Africa’s 50,000 dollar millionaires account 
for less than 0.5 percent of South African households (assuming one dollar 
millionaire per household), and fieldworkers are very unlikely to access their 
properties to interview them. That said, the 2008 household survey data used 
above (including in Figure 3) suggested that the income share of the merely rich 
‘upper classes’ rose, but not as fast as the number of people in these classes. The 
data suggest that the ratio of upper class household incomes to the mean actually 
declined relative to 1993 (although the 2008 data probably understated the 
growth of earnings at the top end). 
 
Whilst most of the super-rich were white, black South Africans made up about 
one half of the ‘upper classes’ by 2008. The extreme case was Patrice Motsepe: 
born in 1962, without inherited wealth, but with net worth of almost $3 billion in 
the 2000s. He briefly challenged for the position of richest South African, but by 
2013 Nicholas Oppenheimer had again pulled ahead, with estimated wealth of 
US$6.5 billion. Motsepe was the only dollar billionaire, but a growing minority 
– about 8,000 – of South Africa’s dollar millionaires were black. The expansion 
of the black elite and middle classes was made possible by the combination of 
neoliberal capitalism and the removal of apartheid-era racial restrictions 
followed by affirmative action (in employment, especially in the public sector) 
and Black Economic Empowerment (which entailed a substantial transfer of 
wealth to the black elite). 
 
Affluence among both white and black South Africans in the 1990s and 2000s 
was reflected in changing residential patterns. Residential racial desegregation 
was accompanied by ‘middle-class enclavization’. The Midrand area north of 
Johannesburg, for example, was developed into ‘seemingly endless low-lying 
compounds that enclose shopping areas, residential estates, and business 
clusters’, with ‘middle-class privilege’ being ‘preserved and even fortified, both 
literally and figuratively’ (Selzer and Heller, 2010: 149). In Johannesburg, and 
probably elsewhere also, the middle classes became more segregated, 
residentially, after the end of apartheid, with the shift from race to class as the 
basis of segregation. Selzer and Heller discuss how middle class privilege was 
reproduced spatially: Where you lived mattered, especially for the middle 
classes, because it facilitated access to schools and provided a crucial marker of 
middle-classness, defining people as middle class, with all of the benefits 
attached to this classification.  
 
Gated, private estates expressed neoliberal influences in obvious respects. 
Infrastructure – including roads, drains and electricity – were generally provided 
by private developers, motivated by profit. But viewing the proliferation of such 
estates simply in terms of neoliberalism risks missing other aspects – and causes 
– of the process. Chipkin investigates the ‘middle-classing’ associated with 
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gated complexes of ‘townhouses’ (i.e. what are called ‘condominiums’ in the 
USA) on the West Rand, west of Johannesburg. Most of the residents of these 
particular complexes were ‘lower middle class’, in terms of our class analysis, 
rather than ‘upper class’ (inclusive of the ‘upper middle class’), but Chipkin’s 
point applies across these classes. Chipkin acknowledges that these estates were 
certainly associated with individualist consumption. But they were also a means 
to locating oneself in the status hierarchy and responding to disorder. ‘In South 
Africa, the uncertainty of the political environment and the unpredictability of 
the regulatory scene are seeing millions of people pursue communal living’, 
Chipkin argued; ‘the move into cluster developments is evidence of a broader 
pursuit of order and community in a world that is increasingly uncertain, 
unpredictable and insecure’ (Chipkin, 2012: 74). For home-buyers, enclavisation 
was not so much an enthusiastic embrace of the market as a regrettable response 
to the perceived collapse of the state’s ability to ensure order and protect 
community. Chipkin also discusses how moving into townhouse complexes 
entails a process of social distancing from the poor (including poorer kin), which 
we shall discuss below. 
 
Ironically, residential estates often failed to generate much community. 
Residents of residential estates prized privacy. In her novel Coconut, Kopano 
Matlwa describes the fictitious Ofilwe (or ‘Fifi’, as she prefers to be called) who 
lives with her father, mother and brother in the ‘Little Valley Country Estate’. 
Despite being protected by 24-hour security guards, there is no community in 
this estate, in contrast to the township where her relatives still live:   
 
‘No toddlers with snotty noses and grubby hands play in the streets in 
Little Valley Country Estate.  Groups of teenage girls in bright T-
shirts, old torn jeans and peak caps do not sit on the front lawn 
pointing and gossiping about the guys that walk past the gates of their 
homes.  Older sisters do not play the wailese loud, so that so that those 
who know the tune can sing along as each mops, dusts and sweeps 
their homes clean.  In Little Valley Country Estate the neighbours are 
the cars you see parked in their driveways and the children are the 
tennis balls that fly over the wall and into your pool.  Here at home, 
Tshepo was my only company and I his’ (Matlwa, 2007: 89-90). 
 
Coconut is a novel about (upper) middle-classing, about the cultural 
classification that denote, and the identity-formation that accompanies, being 
upper middle class. Ofilwe’s father proudly drives a silver-grey Mercedes, and 
plays golf. Ofilwe and her brother are ‘Model C children’, referring to their 
attending formerly white schools that opted for ‘Model C’ semi-private, semi-
public status during the period of transition to democracy. Ofilwe herself speaks 
English at home – the ‘TV language’, ‘the one that spoke of sweet success’ 
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(2007: 54; as social scientists confirm: see Deumert and Mabandla, 2009; Posel 
and Casale, 2011), the language of high status. Ofilwe’s life would be very 
different if she had stayed in the township: 
 
‘Instead of waking up to my cubed fruit, muesli and mixed nuts on a 
bed of low-fat granadilla yoghurt, would I begin my day by polishing 
the red stoep that juts out at the front of Koko’s two-roomed house?  
When bored, would I pass the time by naming stones and creating 
homes for them in the wet dirt that surrounds Koko’s self-made 
outside toilet instead of playing Solitaire on Mama’s laptop, as I do 
now? Would I steal handfuls of sugar from the former mielie-meal 
bucket under the sink and run to lie on the grass to let the sweet 
crystals melt on my tongue instead of forgetting to give Daddy back 
his change, forget it was not mine for the keeping and forget I was not 
supposed to use it to buy honey and almond nougat bars from the 
health shop outside the estate gates? Instead of a decaf Café Latte at 
Bedazzle on Thursday nights would I freeze my Cool-Ad and save it 
for a really hot day?  Would it matter who my clothes were named 
after?  Would I get into respiratory distress at the thought of wearing 
garments with no names at all?’ (Matlwa, 2007: 13-14). 
 
Ofilwe is immersed in her suburban, upper-middle-class life.  She – and her 
parents – seem to embrace westernisation and distance themselves from African 
‘tradition’.  They attend an Anglican church, prefer westernized names over 
African ones, and every Sunday go to the ‘Silver Spoon Coffee Shop’ (in the 
‘Little Square Shopping Centre’) to eat ‘Traditional English Breakfasts’. As a 
recent recruit to the upper middle classes, Matlwa’s Ofilwe does not have the 
cultural capital of young men and women – mostly white – born into privilege. 
She is also very aware of this, and of the racialised character of the asymmetry. 
Newman and De Lannoy (2014) profile Anna, a young (white) architect in Cape 
Town who grew up in the thoroughly upper class suburb of Newlands, a 
neighbourhood populated by doctors, lawyers and other professionals. Anna is 
disappointed not to be offered a place in the medical school at the University of 
Cape Town, and turns to architecture as her second choice. The (real) Anna is 
far more securely rooted in her class than the (fictitious) Ofilwe, but they both 
enjoy massive privileges relative to the vast majority of the population and both 
employ markers of taste as ways of demarcating – and policing – the boundaries 







4. The lower middle and working classes 
 
Enclavisation involves classes beyond the bounds of the ‘upper classes’. Many 
of the home-buyers in new privately-developed estates on the West Rand, for 
example, did not consider themselves rich. Stacey – a white resident profiled by 
Chipkin – was the daughter of a fitter, had what she called an ‘average 
upbringing’, had started working after completing high school, and by 2009 had 
become a bookkeeper. She described herself to Chipkin as ‘middle class or a 
little bit lower … because I’ve got a medical aid and I’ve got my own car and 
I’ve got my own place to stay in’ (2012: 44). Residents – black and white – in 
West Rand neighbourhoods such as Stacey’s included salespersons, supervisors 
and junior managers, technical designers and draughtsmen, and people working 
in the entertainment and sports industries (including disc jockeys and soccer 
players). ‘If what singles out “middle class” roles and functions is their exercise 
of varying degrees of control over how labour is employed and how capital is 
disposed, then residents of Roodepoort are “middle class”’ (2012: 42). Among 
her neighbours were African people escaping the crime, poverty and obligations 
to kin that pervaded much of Soweto and other townships, but who were 
comfortable rather than rich.   
 
In Class, Race and Inequality we used the term ‘middle class’ sparingly, and 
usually within inverted commas, for the simple reason that it is far from clear 
who is ‘middle class’ in the South African context. The occupations and 
lifestyles associated with the ‘middle class’ in the advanced capitalist societies 
of the global North are, in South Africa, far from the middle of the class 
structure. Describing them as ‘middle class’ in South Africa therefore made little 
sense (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: 309). Other studies also pointed to the 
inconsistencies between an occupational understanding of ‘middle class’ and a 
definition based on position in the income distribution (Schlemmer, 2005; 
Muller, 2006a; 2006b; Visagie and Posel, 2013; Burger et al., 2014). There is 
little reason to use the term ‘middle class’ to refer to the middle of the income 
distribution; it is more appropriate to refer to ‘middle income’. The concept of 
‘class’ should be applied to people or households with specified socio-economic 
characteristics (occupations, credentials and skills) or socio-cultural ones 
(cultural capital, identity or status).6  
 
South Africans themselves seem to understand ‘middle class’ in a primarily 
relative sense, although precisely what ‘middle class’ means varies between 
                                           
6 The ‘Living Standard Measures’ (LSMs) used by the South African Audience (formerly 
Advertising) Research Foundation (SAARF) represent an attempt to understand consumers as 
cultural as well as economic agents. The LSMs use asset ownership and financial services as a 
proxy for consumer preferences as well as for the opportunities afforded by incomes. 
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people and places (see also Khunou, 2012). In Soweto, a majority of the 
population self-identified as being ‘in the middle’.7 Phadi and Ceruti interpret 
this as being a reflection less of occupation or education as of consumption, i.e. 
being able to afford basic necessities but not luxuries. People who struggled to 
pay for necessities tended to identify themselves as ‘poor’ or ‘lower class’. Few 
people in Soweto self-identified as upper class. Many of the self-identified 
‘middle class’ Sowetans also identified themselves as ‘working class’ in terms 
of having steady employment and income (Phadi and Ceruti, 2013; Wale, 2013). 
Survey research in Cape Town in 2005 showed that most working people there 
typically chose the label ‘working class’, but distinguished clearly between 
themselves and a ‘lower’ or ‘poor class’. In Cape Town, the ‘middle class’ 
comprised people who thought of themselves as having better lifestyles and 
higher status than the working-class, but were not part of the elite. Controlling 
for occupation, African people in Cape Town were significantly less likely to 
self-identify as ‘middle class’ than coloured or (especially) white people 
(Seekings, 2007a).   
 
In their work on Soweto, Alexander et al. (2013) emphasise the centrality of 
consumption and a discourse of ‘affordability’ to people’s self-identity. In South 
Africa, as elsewhere, taste – in clothes, cars, satellite television at home, and 
even church – is an important marker of social position. But, in Cape Town at 
least, being ‘in the middle’ typically involves also a hierarchical distinction 
between them and people who cannot support themselves and are ‘dependent’ 
(on government grants, subsidised government housing, or kin). Middle-class 
industriousness is often contrasted with the ‘laziness’ of the poor.8 Chipkin 
(2012) describes how, in Roodepoort in Gauteng, moving out of a township and 
into a townhouse complex entails a process of remaking oneself as middle class 
in part through renegotiating one’s relationship with poorer kin. Their 
townhouses are havens ‘from the world of family and kin’, where one is 
insulated ‘from the financial and other claims of extended family, neighbours 
and community’, making possible the savings that allow for new forms of 
consumption (2012: 61). Living in a townhouse also confers respectability in 
part because it allows people to carve out ‘privacy’ away from the 
interdependencies in the public space of the township street. 
 
Given the occupational and cultural heterogeneity of the South African ‘middle 
class’, most studies have disaggregated it. Schlemmer distinguished between a 
‘middle class’ that comprised primarily professionals and managers and a ‘lower 
middle class’ that comprised small business owners, clerical and sales workers, 
                                           
7 In Europe, the concept of the middle class originated in the Seventeenth Century when 
social and economic change was recognised as having resulted in the emergence of a 
‘middling’ kind of person. 
8 This is the subject of continuing research in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. 
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school teachers and nurses, technicians, and skilled white-collar service 
personnel. In South Africa, he suggested, this lower middle class had lower 
status, was unionized, had constrained budgets and had incurred ‘considerable 
debt in order to acquire the accoutrements of a middle-class lifestyle’ (2005: 
118). They therefore behaved more like the unionized working class than the 
(upper) middle class, and Schlemmer concluded that they were not really 
‘middle class’.9 Using data on education, occupation, income and standard of 
living, he calculated that the remaining (upper) ‘middle class’ included, in 2003, 
only about 6 percent of all working people. Muller (2006a, 2006b) distinguished 
between a ‘upper middle class’ comprising teachers and nurses (i.e. the semi-
professional class in our own analysis) and an ‘lower middle class’ comprising 
clerks and similar white-collar workers, in our ‘intermediate’ class). This 
resulted in a much larger ‘middle class’ than Schlemmer’s, with a much higher 
proportion of African members. Selzer and Heller (2010) distinguished between 
an ‘upper middle’ class (including most of our upper classes), a ‘middle middle’ 
class (broadly corresponding to our semi-professional class) and a ‘lower 
middle’ class (our intermediate class). 
 
In the South African context, there are clear and important differences between 
the ‘upper middle’ class(es) – comprising salaried professionals and managers, 
especially – and the ‘lower middle’ classes. The former are, in most respects, an 
integral part of the ‘upper classes’. The latter, as Schlemmer noted, have more in 
common with the respectable, financially stable working classes. Teachers and 
nurses (in the semi-professional class), skilled office workers, artisans and 
supervisors (in the intermediate class) constitute a lower middle-class, although 
in many respects there is only a modest gap between them and semi-skilled, 
formally-employed industrial workers. We therefore retain in our class schema a 
middle cluster of classes, which we now label the ‘lower middle and working 
classes’, distinguishing them from both the upper and lower clusters of classes 
(see Figure 3). In our analysis, the ‘middle classes’ are too disparate to be 
usefully combined into a single cluster. 
 
The middle strata of South African society thus comprise people who consider 
themselves neither poor nor rich, who can afford a wide range of ‘necessities’ – 
which might include a car and a wide range of household appliances – but few 
of the luxuries to which they aspire. They generally see themselves as 
‘respectable’, and contrast themselves with the supposedly indolent, dependent 
poor. In many but not all parts of the country they probably consider themselves, 
at least in relation to their residential neighbourhoods, as ‘middle class’, 
although at work some – including many teachers and nurses – might see 
                                           
9 Schlemmer copied his class scheme from a study of the USA, which categorised skilled 
blue-collar workers as ‘working class’ not ‘lower middle class’.  
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themselves as ‘workers’ and be members of trade unions. Most breadwinners are 
in skilled or white-collar occupations. In the early 2000s, many had moved into 
the non-elite townhouse complexes or housing estates, bought cars, used private 
doctors, and sent their children to multi-racial, semi-public/semi-private schools. 
Many remained in ‘townships’, however, especially in new, privately-built 
neighbourhoods (such as iLitha Park, Ikwezi Park and Graceland in Khayelitsha 
on Cape Town’s eastern periphery).  
 
Growing up in the lower middle or working classes, and entering adulthood after 
1994, entailed real possibilities of upward as well as risks of downward 
mobility. Newman and De Lannoy (2014) provide some examples of children 
growing up in these lower middle class and working class settings. Amanda and 
Thandiswa were both born into respectable working-class families, Amanda in 
Port Elizabeth and Thandiswa in Cape Town. Appreciating the value of 
education, Amanda’s mother got her into a newly multi-racial, formerly white 
high school, where she acquired the cultural capital that eases upward mobility. 
Thandiswa attended township schools, completed high school and can read, 
write, and speak English, but did not have sufficient cultural and social capital to 
secure good employment. When she was interviewed, Amanda was living in 
central Cape Town and working for an NGO, whilst Thandiswa was 
unemployed, living with her parents in Khayelitsha. Both Amanda and 
Thandiswa were African. Amanda’s upward mobility reflected the opportunities 
that opened up with the end of apartheid and a post-Fordist economy. 




5. The lower classes: The working poor and the 
underclass 
 
‘Respectable’ working class households, whose breadwinners were in formal 
employment in industry or services, were in the middle of the South African 
social structure because there were so many others ‘below’ them, in the ranks of 
the ‘poor’ or ‘lower class’. In terms of employment, lifestyles and popular 
perceptions, a large minority of South African households fell into the ‘poor’ or 
‘lower classes’ in the two decades after 1994. Households in these classes often 
could not afford even necessities. They typically lacked the educational 
credentials and skills required to secure well-paid, regular employment in an 
increasingly skill-intensive economy. Additionally, they often lacked the social 
and cultural capital required to access even the occasional opportunities open to 




This lower cluster of classes included the working poor, especially working 
people in the most marginal sectors of the economy such as agriculture and 
domestic work. The cluster also included hawkers and others in ‘survivalist’ 
self-employment with meagre earnings. A better measure of the ‘marginal 
working class’ would include also many working people in casual and other 
informal employment, in a variety of other sectors, although this is difficult to 
operationalise using household survey data. As many as half of the new ‘jobs’ 
created in the late 1990s and early 2000s entailed survivalist (i.e. very low-
income) informal work (Casale et al., 2004). Given increased regulation in the 
formal labour market, especially with respect to lower-skilled employment, 
labour-intensive work shifted increasingly to the informal sector. The lower 
classes thus encompassed the ‘precariat’ (see Bank, 2011; Murray 2008; 2011). 
 
The cluster also includes many unemployed people. Unemployment was the 
primary driver of poverty in post-apartheid South Africa, notwithstanding the 
fact that some working people were also poor. The expanded or broad rate of 
unemployment rose from 30 percent in 1993 to over 40 percent in 2002 and 
2003. The unemployment rate then declined somewhat, until 2008, before rising 
again amidst a global economic downturn (see Figure 4). The expanded 
definition of unemployment includes people who are not working but want and 
are available for employment, even if they are not actively looking for 
employment. The reason for including ‘discouraged’ job-seekers is because, in 
South Africa, the reality is that often there is little or no point in ‘actively’ 
looking for work because, firstly, there is no work to be found and, secondly, the 
‘active’ ways of looking for work (such as looking in newspapers) are not the 
ways through which less skilled people ever find work. Even using the narrow 
or strict definition of unemployment, which includes only ‘active’ job-seekers, 
the unemployment rate passed 30 percent in the early 2000s, and was still above 
25 percent at the time of the 2014 election. These unemployment rates remain 
much higher than they were in 1994 and are higher than almost everywhere else 
in the world outside of Southern Africa. The number of unemployed (again 
using the expanded definition) doubled from less than 4 million in 1994 to 
almost 7.6 million in the second quarter of 2014.10  
 
  
                                           
10 Using the narrow definition, the number rose from approximately 2 million to about 5.15 
million. There is some uncertainty about the precise numbers in 1994 because surveys 
conducted between 1993 and 1995 generated rather different findings (see Bhorat and 





Figure 4: Unemployment and joblessness, 1993-2014 
 
 
For the government, unemployment was an embarrassment. Unsurprisingly, it 
seized on studies suggesting that economic growth was not jobless (and then 
ignored Casale et al.’s findings that much of the supposed growth was the result 
of changed methodology and most of the new jobs were informal). The 
government also routinely reported the growth of employment in terms of 
numbers (‘one million new jobs’) whilst reporting unemployment as a rate, 
thereby avoiding the fact that the absolute number of unemployed rose steadily 
(see, for example, South Africa, 2014). The government also lapsed into 
denialism, especially in the early 2000s. President Mbeki opined that ‘the 
informal sector of our economy is out of sight of many statisticians and public 
commentators’.11 His loyal Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, similarly 
suggested that the ‘surge in expenditure [on] consumer durables or the white 
goods sector’ and ‘the profitability of the retail apparel sector’ showed ‘that this 
is not a country with unemployment at 32% or 40%. … People who are really 
unemployed and completely down and out are not going to have the resources to 
purchase the kind of non-essentials – clothing, appliances, furniture, that whole 
range of goods – at quite the rate we’re seeing.’ The official data, he suggested, 
underestimated employment because so many independent workers – such as 
carpenters, bricklayers and welders – lied to survey fieldworkers and were 
therefore ‘off the radar screen’.12 Subsequent research confirmed that some of 
                                           
11 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at42.htm. 
12 Sunday Times, ‘Business Times’ section, 12th December, 2004. See also comments by 
Manuel in Business Report, 28th February 2005, and by President Mbeki in Sunday Times, 
22nd May 2005, both cited by Hemson and O’Donovan (2006: 18). 
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the first post-apartheid surveys (especially the 1995 OHS) had suffered from 
sampling and other flaws (Wittenberg, 2014). By the early 2000s, however, the 
quality of employment data was greatly improved, especially with respect to 
whether the apparently unemployed really were jobless. Surveys typically asked 
a series of questions, including (in the case of the LFS from 2000) business 
activities (‘big or small’, providing as examples ‘selling things, making things 
for sale, repairing things, guarding cars, brewing beer, hairdressing’), working 
on a plot or farm, fishing or hunting, and even begging ‘for money or food in 
public’. The LFS also enquired how every unemployed household member 
supported him- or herself, asking specifically whether he or she ‘did odd jobs 
during the past seven days’; if the person had done so, he or she was routed back 
into the sequence of questions about work. Despite these probes, very many 
people answered consistently that they were not doing any work, but wanted 
work. Careful studies of informal businesses did not suggest that they were 
much more extensive than the labour market surveys suggested (see Seekings 
and Nattrass, 2005: 320-22; Devey et al., 2006) and other data confirmed that 
very many young people were not working (Wittenberg, 2009); No research 
supported the government’s scepticism about official unemployment statistics 
produced in the 2000s.  
 
Unemployment was not only exceptionally high, but was also often long-term. 
The September 2005 LFS showed that two out of every three unemployed 
people (using the strict definition) had never had a job. One-third of these – or 
about 1 million people – had been unemployed for three years or more. 
Unemployment rates were consistently highest among school-leavers, declined 
among men and women in their late 20s and 30s, then rose again among people 
in their 50s. Unemployment rates were much higher among less educated and 
rural youth (see Seekings, 2012). 
 
The unemployed were not homogeneous, however. The methodology used to 
derive the classes represented in Figures 1 and 3 allocated many unemployed 
people to classes in the middle cluster, including especially the ‘intermediate’ 
and ‘petty traders’ classes, because they lived with people whose occupations or 
work put them into these classes. But just over one half of all unemployed 
people in 2008 were in the lower classes, and 43 percent were in the 
‘underclass’. In Class, Race and Inequality, we defined the ‘underclass’ as 
people who suffered systematic disadvantage in the labour market, with the 
result that they faced no real possibility of escaping from poverty (Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005: chapter 8). Some unemployed people lacked the skills (including 
language skills), credentials, the connections (i.e. social capital) and perhaps 
also understanding of the labour market (an aspect of cultural capital) which 
were crucial in terms of finding sustained employment. Probably the most 
important form of social capital was having family or friends who had jobs and 
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were able to connect you to employment opportunities (and help you understand 
the labour market). It was therefore especially worrying that the number and 
proportion of the unemployed living in ‘workerless’ households, i.e. where no 
one was in wage employment, rose after 1994 (Pirouz, 2005; Oosthuizen, 2006). 
 
The final ‘class’ in this lower class bundle was a residual, ‘other’ category, 
comprising households where no one was employed and no one was 
unemployed (even using a broad definition of unemployment). These 
households typically comprised pensioners and children, in part because of 
AIDS mortality. Some comprised adults engaged in survivalist self-employment, 
but most were detached from the labour market. 
 
 
6: Class differences between the lower middle, 
working and lower classes 
 
Our identification (in Class, Race and Inequality) of an ‘underclass’ in South 
Africa provoked a range of criticism (including Alexander et al., 2012; 
Callebert, 2014). Some of this criticism was due to a misunderstanding or 
misrepresentation of our argument (see Seekings, 2014). Some of the criticism 
was rooted in unease with the concept of the ‘underclass’ – unease which we 
shared (see Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: 273-77, 298) despite our definition of 
the underclass (and the lower classes generally) in terms of systematic 
disadvantage not of supposed delinquency or criminality. Some criticism was 
rooted in underlying theoretical differences, with Marxian critics objecting to 
any disaggregation of the non-capitalist population into separate classes.  
 
Critics also raised some substantive empirical questions about the relationships, 
similarities and differences between our different ‘classes’. Most importantly, 
Alexander et al. (2013) argued that, in Soweto, the unemployed, semi-
employed, self-employed and the employed were thrown together in a shared 
‘proletarian community of fate’. Whilst people occupied varied positions in 
relation to both individual employment and household membership, the 
differences between these positions were modest (according to Alexander et al.) 
in crucial (although not all) respects. ‘If the worlds of work are an onion’, wrote 
Ceruti, referring to von Holdt and Webster’s (2005) suggestion that a core of 
regular, formal employment was surrounded by layers of casual or informal 
work, with an outer layer comprising the unemployed, then ‘at the township and 
household level the onion is chopped and diced’ (2013b: 115). The formally 
employed, casual employed, self-employed and unemployed were all linked 
within and between households, Alexnder et al. argued, questioning the 
24 
 
distinction we drew between the lower middle and working classes, on the one 
hand, and the lower classes, on the other.  
 
Alexander et al.’s research raised five important empirical questions. Do 
individuals and households straddle different labour market positions and 
livelihood strategies? Is there flux in people’s labour market or class positions 
over time? Are the unemployed especially disadvantaged? Is Soweto typical of 
South Africa? And how do the connections between households mitigate the 
significance of their differences?   
 
Whilst some people and households combined livelihood strategies (for 
example, part-time wage employment with survivalist self-employment), the 
scope for lucrative, multiple livelihood strategies declined in the late twentieth 
centuries. There really are many individuals who are (as Ceruti puts it) ‘outright 
unemployed’. In Soweto, as across South Africa, there were alarming numbers 
of people, especially younger people, who, when asked ‘do you work?’, replied 
‘no’, and when asked ‘what do you do?’, replied ‘nothing’, ‘sit at home’ or 
‘looking for a job’ (Ceruti, 2013b: 109; see also Wittenberg, 2009). Many 
unemployed young adults were not helping grow vegetables, or looking after 
livestock, or working in a family-run spaza shop, nor were they working part-
time or hawking goods in the street; they really were unemployed. The multiple 
livelihoods argument is easily overstated. In any case, our class schema did 
allow for some combinations of livelihoods. 
 
Secondly, there clearly is some flux in individuals’ employment status. Such 
flux as well as changing household composition can cause whole households to 
move from one class to another. Ceruti suggests that we underestimated ‘how 
perilously close “core” working-class households may be to their “underclass” 
in the current labour market’ (2013b: 114). Our own and other work suggest 
that, over time, relatively advantaged people tend to remain advantaged whilst 
relatively disadvantaged people tend to remain disadvantaged. It is the relatively 
advantaged who benefit from opportunities for further upward mobility, so that 
inequalities and stratification tend to reproduce themselves (Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005: 232-4, 277-80, 322-6; Agüero et al., 2007; Woolard and Klasen, 
2007; Girdwood and Leibbrandt, 2009; Ziervogel and Crankshaw, 2009; Finn et 
al., 2012). Our underclass thesis would be seriously undermined if it was shown 
that unemployed people in ‘underclass’ households were as likely to secure 
employment as unemployed people in more advantaged classes, i.e. that social 
and cultural capital count for little. On the contrary, however, the evidence 
confirms that social capital is crucial to securing employment, especially for 
people without educational credentials, such that households with little social 
capital are systematically disadvantaged – especially in rural areas (Seekings 
25 
 
and Nattrass, 2005: 280-6; Schöer  et al., 2014; see also Schöer and Leibbrandt, 
2006).  
 
In Soweto, ‘people living in households where all the adults were unemployed’ 
– i.e. the underclass – ‘were the poorest’ (Ceruti, 2013b: 118), but they were not 
the only impoverished households. Indeed, the fact that some unemployed 
people were supported by household members with work meant that they were 
less poor than some under- or partly-employed individuals who were too poor to 
turn down such opportunities for meagre earnings (Alexander and Wale, 2013: 
135-140). 
 
Finally, because Soweto is not representative of South Africa, even if the line 
between the working and lower classes was blurred there does not mean that 
there is no clear line across the country as a whole. Alexander et al. show that, 
by various measures, the population of Soweto was disadvantaged relative to 
rich (especially white) people. At the same time, however, few households in 
Soweto were in the poorest third of the population of South Africa as a whole. 
Few households in Soweto experienced the deep poverty that was commonplace 
in the former banstutans. In 1993, we calculated, only one in six households in 
metropolitan areas fell into the most disadvantaged of our three strata (shown in 
Figure 1). In contrast, as many as 60 percent of households in ‘rural’ areas fell 
into this disadvantaged cluster. The real test of the underclass thesis lies not in 
Soweto, but in places like Dimbaza (in the Eastern Cape) and Phutaditjaba (in 
the southern Free State), where South Africa’s poorest and most disadvantaged 
households are to be found: households comprising people who typically have 
few skills and no credentials (Van der Berg et al., 2003), no usable work 
experience, no financial or economic capital, limited access to land, little 
cultural capital, and little or no social capital. 
 
Mosoetsa’s research in KwaZulu-Natal illustrates some of the realities of life for 
the underclass in non-metropolitan areas. Poverty and a strong sense of 
responsibility to younger kin mean that many adults as well as children live with 
their elderly parents or grandparents. Unemployment hangs over everyone. Most 
households survive through a mix of government grants and growing their own 
vegetables. Some earn a very modest income through making clothes or 
hawking food. If someone has any cash or food to spare, he or she often helps 
out neighbours or kin. Grants are indispensable, but also feed into social 
tensions. Older men, especially, are humiliated by unemployment, often turn to 
drink, lose respect, and respond violently, especially against women. 





Metropolitan, urban and rural areas were historically connected via labour 
migration and remittance flows. From the 1980s, however, these links were 
eroded, with inter-household remittances accounting for a shrinking proportion 
of the income of the underclass. By 2009, the poor relied overwhelmingly on 
public transfers (Leibbrandt et al., 2012: 23-24). The direct economic ties 
between workers in urban formal employment and rural underclass households 
had collapsed (see also Mosoetsa, 2011). 
 
Just as most people in Soweto had a clear sense that they were ‘in the middle’ 
(Alexander et al., 2013), poor people in remote townships in KwaZulu-Natal 
perceived themselves as being disadvantaged relative to formally-employed, 
unionised workers in metropolitan areas (Mosoetsa, 2011). In Cape Town, poor 
people in neighbourhoods with high unemployment are also very aware of their 
poverty (see, for example, Muyeba and Seekings, 2011). Barchiesi (2011) 
similarly seems to suggest that his working-class informants on the East Rand 
make a clear distinction between the respectability of a proper job, with security 
and benefits, and the indignity of precariousness. Together, studies such as these 
present a fragmentary but suggestive picture of a society in which fairly clear 
lines are drawn between the often conspicuous consumerism associated with the 
upper classes, the respectable sufficiency or affordability associated with a 
modest but steady wage in the lower middle and working classes, and the 
insufficiency, indignity and ‘dependency’ often associated with unemployment 
and poverty in the lower classes. Precisely where these lines are drawn is 





The class structure of societies such as South Africa pose challenges to any 
political project concerning  inclusive economic growth, particularly through 
redistribution to the poor. South Africa is not an agrarian society where the poor 
would benefit from policies that strengthen the peasantry. Nor is it like the 
European (and Australasian) societies where social democratic movements 
achieved pro-poor labour market and social policies. The class(es) that provided 
the historic bedrock of social democracy do not, in South Africa, include the 
poor. In South Africa, these classes – i.e. the working and later lower middle 
classes – are in the middle, or even above the middle, of the income distribution. 
This is because poverty is the result not so much of low wages for the formally-
employed as of the scarcity of formal employment (or any employment at all). 
In South Africa, the poor comprise the working poor, mostly in informal 




Globally and historically, social democracy has been premised on full 
employment. In the absence of full employment, the tradeoff between higher 
wages and job creation is inevitable and challenging. There are many poor 
people living in households that would benefit from both higher wages and job 
creation. But there are also many poor households that require job creation if 
poverty is to be reduced substantially and sustainably. In Class, Race and 
Inequality we argued that social justice demanded either that the poor are 
supported through more encompassing and redistributive social programmes or 
that jobs are created so that they can support themselves. The latter would 
require an expansion of mostly unskilled work, for men and women without 
strong skills. This new work would necessarily be low-paid, because neither the 
private sector nor the state will create high-wage unskilled jobs, especially in 
tradable sectors. Unsurprisingly, there is abundant evidence that job creation is 
an overwhelming popular priority, especially in the poorest areas. ‘All we want 
are jobs for our children’, one older woman told Mosoetsa. Another reiterated 
that ‘we want jobs for our children’. ‘Things were much better during apartheid’ 
because ‘there were jobs’ (quoted in Mosoetsa, 2011: 31).  
 
For the lower middle and working classes, however, the priority is higher wages, 
which would allow them to afford luxuries as well as necessities, and to respond 
more generously to the claims made on them by poorer kin. Unfortunately, 
however, higher wages paid to many employed workers have not trickled down 
to the poor. Indeed, as wages have risen, remittances have declined. A high-
wage strategy has not reduced inequalities, poverty or social exclusion. Insofar 
as the high-wage strategy has fuelled a more skill- and capital-intensive growth 
path, it worsened inequalities, poverty and social exclusion. The existence of an 
‘underclass’ serves to expose the fundamental flaw in the argument that higher 
wages would suffice to solve the problems of poverty and inequality in South 
Africa. 
 
In the South African context, recognising the lower classes, and the underclass 
in particular, has the great strength of helping to focus attention on who is truly 
disadvantaged, and to remind us that job creation should not simply be forgotten 
in a clamour for higher wages (and subsidised services). Social citizenship for 
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